[27] Misrepresenting Halliday's Explanation of Ergative Nuclearity As Doran's Argument For Martin's Orbital Structure Model

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading in two ways. Firstly, Doran falsely presents Halliday's ideas as if they were his own. Halliday (1985: 146-7):

Except in the special case of the medio–receptive voice, the Medium is obligatory in all processes; and it is the only element that is, other than the process itself. … The Medium is also the only element that is never introduced into the clause by means of a preposition (again with the same exception of medio–receptives); … The Process and the Medium together form the nucleus of an English clause; and this nucleus then determines the range of options that are available to the rest of the clause.

Secondly, Doran falsely presents Halliday's description of nuclearity — a nonlinear interpretation of the ergative model of transitivity — as if it were support for Martin's orbital model of structure.

Moreover, Doran shows no evidence of being aware of the elaboration of this model in Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 165-176) as 'degree of participation' and 'degree of involvement'.

[2] Less importantly, contrā Doran, circumstances can occur as Subject, as demonstrated by circumstantial identifying relational clauses; Halliday (1985: 121):

[26] Problems With Martin's Orbital Model Of Experiential Structure

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Martin (1996) misunderstands Halliday (1985, 1994) and Matthiessen (1995) by misconstruing the (multivariate) experiential structure of a clause as a (univariate) logical structure in which the Process and Medium constitute the dominant element (nucleus), with the Agent and Location as dependent (satellites):

In SFL Theory, interdependency relations obtain between units in unit complexes, not between elements in a unit.

[2] To be clear, the model in Martin (1996) is not only inconsistent with the model in Martin (1992: 319), which preceded Matthiessen (1995):

but also with the model in Martin & Rose (2007: 95), which followed both Matthiessen (1995) and Martin (1996):

[25] Martin's Orbital And Serial Structures

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, before Matthiessen (1995), Martin's (1992: 22) model was:

and after Matthiessen (1995), Martin's (1996) model became:

[2] As previously explained, Martin's orbital structure misconstrues the multivariate structure of the experiential metafunction as the univariate relation of hypotaxis. As Doran confirms, "there is status distinction" (nucleus vs satellite).

[3] To be clear, Martin's serial structure, which, contrā Doran, he does not class as iterative, is not just similar to univariate structure, it is Martin's model of univariate structure. However, as previously explained, in modelling logical structure as multi-nuclear, it construes each unit as having the same status, and so reduces all univariate structure to parataxis.

[24] The Nuclear Model Of Clause Transitivity

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in this early, first exploration of structure types by metafunction, Halliday (1979) considered three non-linear representations of experiential structure (in addition to the linear):

[2] Importantly, 'dependency construct' refers to a tree structure schema, not to interdependency in the sense of tactic relations between units. It will be seen in future posts that Doran confuses the two.

[3] To be clear, the notion of a clause nucleus was taken up in Halliday (1985: 147) — and every edition of IFG since — but applied to the ergative model, not the transitive model, of clause transitivity:

The Process and the Medium together form the nucleus of an English clause; and this nucleus then determines the range of options that are available to the rest of the clause. Thus the nucleus ‘tear + cloth’ represents a small semantic field which may be realised as a clause either alone or in combination with other participant or circumstantial functions.

Matthiessen (1995: 197) then developed this as a cline of nuclearity/peripherality of involvement:

which was then greatly elaborated in Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 165-176) as degree of participation and degree of involvement, and used to relate participants and circumstances in terms of logico-semantic relations:

[23] Misrepresenting SFL Theory On Hypotaxis

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] Doran's first point is misleading, because it is untrue. In SFL Theory, hypotaxis ("status differences") is a relation in iterative structures of the logical metafunction only. The source of Doran's confusion, as will be seen, is the model of structure in Martin (1996):

which unwittingly misconstrues the distinction between experiential and logical structure as the distinction between hypotaxis (the unequal status of nucleus and satellite) and parataxis (the equal status of multiple nuclei).

[2] As was the case with the multivariate vs univariate distinction, Doran again begins his argument on experiential structure with Halliday's first statement on the matter, instead of later revised theorising.

[3] To be clear, what Doran refers to as a 'flat' structure, Halliday (1979) terms a linear structure.

[22] Problems With Status And Iteration As Independent Factors

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, hypotaxis ("status differences") is an interdependency relation that obtains only between units in unit complexes; that is, it obtains only in the iterative univariate structures of the logical metafunction. As demonstrated previously, Martin's notion of a subjacency duplex does not involve hypotaxis because it is not a unit complex, though if it were a complex, contrā Doran's analysis, it would indeed be an iterative structure, not a "non-iterative" structure.

That is, Doran has provided no valid evidence for his claim that status (interdependency) and iteration (in the sense of iterative structure) "can be separated out as independent factors".

[2] To be clear, it is only the third column of Doran table that is theoretically tenable. The first column is redundant because the terms of its cells, equal vs unequal status, only validly apply to the third column, and are merely glosses the terms 'parataxis' and 'hypotaxis' in that column.

The cells of the second column are invalid, on the one hand, because interdependency ("status") does not apply to multivariate structures, as will be demonstrated in future posts, and on the other hand, because subjacency duplexes are not valid structure types, as previously demonstrated.

[21] Misconstruing A Spanish Prepositional Phrase As A Complex

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, from the perspective of SFL Theory, the logical structure of this nominal group is:

That is, what Martin terms 'subjacency complex' is actually the prepositional phrase serving as Postmodifier of the nominal group, and what he terms 'clitic' is actually the preposition of that prepositional phrase.

Importantly, although Martin interprets the prepositional phrase as a logical structure, a complex of Modifier and Head, prepositional phrases do not actually have a logical structure, because they are not groups (or complexes). Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 425):

But note that prepositional phrases are phrases, not groups; they have no logical structure as Head and Modifier, and cannot be reduced to a single element. In this respect, they are clause-like rather than group-like;

Moreover, in terms of constituency, Martin's analysis of the Spanish nominal group is inconsistent with his previous analysis of the English nominal group, since in the Spanish example, the preposition forms a complex with the nominal within the prepositional phrase, whereas, in the English example, the preposition forms a complex with the nominals outside the prepositional phrase.

[2] To be clear, the interpretation of de ruedas as Classifier, rather than Qualifier, is called into question by instances such as los neutrinos solares ('solar neutrinos'):

[20] The Original Sources Of 'Subjacency' And 'Duplex'

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Martin actually called these misconstrued structures 'subjacency duplexes':

[2] To be clear, Martin took the term 'subjacency' from Government and Binding Theory (Chomsky 1973), while Rose (2001) took the term 'duplex' from Matthiessen (1995), where it simply means a two-unit complex. However, Rose (2001) applied the term to verbal group complexes — and nothing else. On this basis, it can be said that Doran's wording above is misleading.

[3] To be clear, given the previous arguments, any use of 'subjacent structures' to describe any of the world's languages is the application of a theoretical confusion.

[19] Martin's Solution To The Non-Problem Of Structure Marker 'Of'

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously observed, the logical structure of this nominal group is:

[2] To be clear, Martin's (quite bizarre) solution to this non-existent problem is to misconstrue the numeral and noun as forming a complex with the preposition of the embedded prepositional phrase:

As previously explained, two litres and of do not form a unit complex because

• of is just one of two constituents of the prepositional phrase of water, and
• there is no logico-semantic relation of expansion or projection between two litres and of.

[3] To be clear, Martin's proposed "complex" is not a complex, and so it is not an iterative structure. On the other hand, if it were a complex, it would be an iterative structure, because all complexes are iterative structures, regardless of the number of units involved.

[18] Misrepresenting The SFL Analysis Of The Structure Marker 'Of'

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the structure marker of is accounted for in terms of the univariate logical structure of the nominal group where it is construed as a constituent of the rankshifted prepositional phrase serving as Postmodifier

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the structure marker of is not dependent on two litres (which is only an embedded nominal group in the multivariate experiential analysis). There are two main reasons for this:

• interdependency relations obtain between units in unit complexes, and two litres and of are not two units that form a unit complex — i.e. two litres and of do not form a nominal group complex, or a preposition group complex — since of is a constituent of the prepositional phrase of water;
• interdependency relations involve the logico-semantic relations of expansion and projection, and there is no such relation between two litres and of.

[3] To be clear, the reason why "we can't have a nominal group of water" is that of water is a prepositional phrase, not a nominal group.

[4] To be clear, the question of whether of can or cannot "re-iterate" only arises from the misunderstandings identified in [1], [2] and [3] above.

[5] To be clear, in this instance, the structure marker of relates the nominals two litres and water and it is modelled in SFL Theory as a constituent of the prepositional phrase that serves as Postmodifier in the univariate structure of the nominal group.

It will be seen in the following post that Martin's proposed solution to this non-existent problem does not in fact relate two litres to the rest of the nominal group, since it only relates two litres to of, and does so by misconstruing of as dependent on two litres in a two-unit complex; see [2] above.

[17] Interdependency

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, parataxis and hypotaxis do not describe relations between elements in function structures. Rather, parataxis and hypotaxis are degrees of interdependency between formal units in unit complexes: between clauses in clause complexes, between groups/phrases in group/phrase complexes, and between words in word complexes; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 451). 

[2] To be clear, it is true that, in SFL Theory, interdependency relations obtain in univariate structures, and not in multivariate structures. This means that they obtain in the iterative structures that realise the logical metafunction.

On the other hand, Doran's notion of "potential for iteration" derives from his previous misconstrual of "iterated" elements as an iterative structure. It will soon be seen that this misunderstanding forms the basis of his next argument.

[16] Proposing A Formal Solution To A Non-Existent Problem

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, there is no problem here, and so, no solution is called for. As previously demonstrated, all Doran's previous examples are unambiguously multivariate structures: segmental structures of the experiential metafunction. Doran's false conclusion derives from confusing "iterated" experiential elements with iterative structures — unit complexes — of the logical metafunction.

[2] As will be seen as this blog unfolds, the 'factors' solution that Doran proposes for this non-existent problem involves adopting the 'distinctive features' approach of Formal phonology to structure types — without regard to the metafunctional meaning that the structures realise.

[15] Misconstruing "Iterated Elements" As Iterative Structure

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Doran's claim here is that a multivariate structure with multiple occurrences of a specific element is inconsistent with the notion of a multivariate structure, because Halliday (1965) stipulated that the elements of a multivariate structure occur only once. 

However, Halliday (1965) was his very first paper distinguishing multivariate and univariate structures, written at the time of Scale & Category Grammar, before the emergence of Systemic Functional Grammar. It also included the similarly mistaken claim that Modifier°Head structures are multivariate, rather than univariate. No paper in the 56 years since Halliday (1965) has claimed that the elements of a multivariate structure occur only once (with the sole exception of the current work of Doran and Martin).

However, what is truly astonishing here is Doran's assumption that Halliday — unlike Doran — would fail to notice that such structures contradict the notion of multivariate structure ascribed to him by Doran.

[2] To be clear, the data that Doran presents as evidence of his claim are artificial constructions, rather than attested examples in natural texts. But, in any case, none of the "iterations" constitutes an iterative structure, since iterative structures are unit complexes, formed out of logico-semantic relations, such as group complexes or clause complexes. That is, the three Epithets do form an "Epithet complex", the two Qualifiers do not form a "Qualifier complex" and the three Locations do not form a "Location complex".

[3] To be clear, the clause example does not support Doran's case, even in Doran's own terms, because it actually features one Location — not three — realised by a (textually motivated) discontinuous elaborating paratactic prepositional phrase complex:

 

Compare the textually agnate clause:

and the agnate clause that deploys embedding instead:

[14] Misrepresenting Korean Nominal Groups

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, it is not true that Korean nominal groups afford a maximum of only one Epithet. This claim is invalidated, for example, by the instance khu-n say chayk ‘big new book’, which appears in the paper Word Order and NP Structure in Korean: A Constraint Based Approach by Kim, Lee & Lee.

[2] To be clear, this example does not demonstrate that potential second Epithets can only be accommodated in Korean nominal groups "through complexing at the rank below".  There are two reasons for this. The first is that jeongi 'electricity' is a Classifier, not a potential Epithet, and the second is that the structure of the nominal group does not involve "complexing at the rank below"; it is simply structured as Epithet ^ Classifier ^ Thing:

[13] Multivariate Vs Univariate Structure

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 451) explain a multivariate structure as follows:

A multivariate structure is a configuration of different functional relationships, like Theme + Rheme, Mood + Residue + Moodtag, or Actor + Process + Recipient + Goal. Note that, although it is the functions that are labelled, the structure actually consists of the relationships among them. While we have modelled all multivariate structures in terms of constituency, this structural mode is in fact most appropriate for the experiential mode of meaning. That is, the relationships among the elements in a multivariate structure can be characterised as segmental from an experiential point of view but as prosodic from an interpersonal point of view and as culminative from a textual one. A prototypical example of a segmental structure is the transitivity structure of a clause, a prototypical example of a prosodic structure is the tone contour that typically extends over a clause, and a prototypical example of a culminative structure is thematic prominence at the beginning of the clause (followed by rhematic non-prominence).

That is, in SFL Theory, the number of occurrences of a functional relation is irrelevant. For example, the experiential structure of a clause can feature multiple circumstances, and the interpersonal structure of a clause can feature multiple Adjuncts.

[2] To be clear, Halliday & Matthiessen (ibid.) explain a univariate structure as follows:

A univariate structure is an iteration of the same functional relationship: for example ‘and’ as in Bill Brewer, Jan Stewer, Peter Gurney, Peter Davy, Dan’l Whiddon, Harry Hawk, Old Uncle Tom Cobbley and all; ‘equals’ as in Tom, Tom, the piper’s son (Tom = Tom = the piper’s son); ‘is a subset of’ as in newfashioned three-cornered cambric country-cut handkerchief (what kind of handkerchief? – country-cut; what kind of country-cut handkerchief? – cambric, ... ); and so on. Such iterative structures are unique to the logical mode of meaning; they are, as noted, formed out of logico-semantic relations.

Importantly, iteration is the underlying principle of all univariate structures, because the second and subsequent units of a logical structure are each singly generated by re-entering the same network that generated the first unit. Matthiessen & Kasper(1987: 46):

Logical systems are assumed to be (linearly) recursive. The recursion is represented by a loop back to the entry condition in the system…

[12] Misrepresenting A 'Pre-Systemic' Citation As Representative Of SFL Theory

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

As previously explained, Halliday's first statement on multivariate and univariate structures, Halliday (1965), is written at the time of Scale & Category Grammar, not Systemic Functional Grammar, and, most importantly, is not consistent with Halliday's later theorising. For example, in this paper, and in no work since, Halliday stipulates (pp229, 232) that, in multivariate structures, different variables each occur once only. Similarly, in this paper, and in no work since, Halliday (p230) categorises Head°Modifier structures as multivariate, instead of univariate:

In short, Doran has misrepresented Halliday's very first 'Scale & Category Grammar' statement on multivariate structure as consistent with Halliday's later understanding of it in SFL Theory.

[11] The Relevance Of Huddleston (1965) To Structure Types In SFL Theory

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, to cite an author, rather than the argument on which the conclusion of the author is based, is a fallacious use of the appeal to authority (argumentum ad verecundiam).

Moreover, in 1965, 

1. Systemic Functional Grammar had not yet been devised by Halliday,
2. the metafunctions had not yet been devised by Halliday, and so
3. the favoured structure types of the metafunctions had not yet been devised by Halliday.

As previously noted, the first statement on structure types varying according to metafunction appears 14 years later: Modes of meaning and modes of expression: types of grammatical structure and their determination by different semantic functions (Halliday 1979).

On the other hand, in 1965, Halliday did publish his first paper on the distinction between multivariate and univariate structures, though the focus was primarily on univariate structures, and the distinction between hypotaxis and parataxis. However, importantly, his characterisations of these structure types at that time were inconsistent with the view he eventually arrived at. 

For example, as previously noted, Halliday (1965) classified a Head°Modifier structure as multivariate, rather than univariate, and defined a multivariate structure as comprising 'a specific set of variables each occurring once only', though the stipulation on the number of occurrences plays no part in any descriptions since the formulation of SFL Theory.

[10] The Structure Types To Be Discussed

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, by 'particulate structures', Doran means those of the experiential metafunction. This usage is inconsistent with Martin (1996), where 'particulate' describes the structures of both the experiential (orbital) and logical (serial) metafunctions:

Less importantly, this usage is also inconsistent with Halliday ± Matthiessen (1994, 2004, 2014) who use the term 'segmental' for the structure type favoured by the experiential metafunction. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 85):

[2] To be clear, by 'non-structural relations', Doran means the cohesive relations of the textual metafunction, at the stratum of lexicogrammar, first theorised by Halliday & Hasan (1976). And by 'covariate structures', Doran means Martin's (1992) reinterpretation of Halliday & Hasan's non-structural cohesive relations as covariate structures — after Lemke 1985 — when he rebranded their lexicogrammatical cohesion as his discourse semantics. Importantly, however, by 1992, Lemke had already recanted his view that 'covariate' was a type of structure. Lemke (1988: 159):

My own 'covariate structure' (Lemke 1985), which includes Halliday's univariate type, is for the case of homogeneous relations of co-classed units, and should perhaps be called a 'structuring principle' rather than a kind of structure.

[3] As will be seen as this blog unfolds, the theorising in this paper actually moves from shaky ground to groundlessness.