[39] Problems With The Factors Of Covariate Structures

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, as previously demonstrated, Doran's linearity corresponds to the relation between satellites in Martin's orbital (mono-nuclear) model of structure, which, in turn, misrepresents the multivariate structure of the experiential metafunction as a univariate hypotactic structure of the logical metafunction.

[2] To be clear, in Doran's own terms, it could be argued that there is indeed "difference in status" in this example: between the whole (dog) on the one hand, and the parts (mouth, teeth, neck), on the other. 

(Note that conformation is not a part of body or dog, since it refers to the form or shape of the dog.)

[38] Problems With Lexical Relations As Structures

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, 'lexical relations' refers to Martin's (1992) system of IDEATION, which is his rebranding of his misunderstandings of lexical cohesion (Halliday & Hasan 1976), relocated from textual lexicogrammar to experiential discourse semantics. Evidence here.

Importantly, from the perspective of SFL Theory, these cohesive relations are not structures, either in the sense of a unit as a configuration of elements, or in the sense of a complex of units.

[2] To be clear, Doran's second point again confuses the general notion of iteration (repetition) with iterative as a specific type of structure that realises the logical metafunction.

[3] To be clear, Doran's third point mistakes meronymic relations for interdependency relations, and mistakes lexical items for elements of structure.

[4] To be clear, Doran's fourth and fifth points are untenable, even in his own model. On the one hand, if these were relations of dependency, the relation would be hypotaxis, which corresponds, in terms of Doran's resources, to Martin's orbital (mono-nuclear) structure. So, on this basis, there should be a nucleus to which everything else relates.

On the other hand, given that these are part-whole relations, Doran could just as easily make the argument, from his own perspective, that the whole constitutes the nucleus, with the parts as satellites, though this would undermine the point he is trying to make.

And, in the final line, Doran shows again that he does not understand that 'interdependency' refers to taxis (parataxis and hypotaxis). 

[37] The Problem With Covariate Structures

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, on the basis of Martin's term 'discourse semantics', Doran here presents the distinction between discourse and grammar as stratal. However, in SFL Theory, 'discourse' refers to one angle on language as instance. Halliday (2008: 78):

“discourse” is text that is being viewed in its sociocultural context, while “text” is discourse that is being viewed as a process of language.

And analysing discourse means relating the text to the grammar as potential. Halliday (2008: 192):

The system and the text are not two different phenomena: what we call the “system” of a language is equivalent to its “text potential”. Analysing discourse means, first and foremost, relating the text to the potential that lies behind it.

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 731):

A text is meaningful because it is an actualisation of the potential that constitutes the linguistic system; it is for this reason that the study of discourse (‘text linguistics’) cannot properly be separated from the study of the grammar that lies behind it.

And it is the textual component within the grammar that is the resource for creating discourse. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 528):

The “textual” metafunction is the name we give to the systematic resources a language must have for creating discourse: for ensuring that each instance of text makes contact with its environment. The “environment” includes both the context of situation and other instances of text.

And the systems of cohesion constitute the non-structural textual resources of the grammar for creating discourse.

[2] To be clear, covariate structures are not types of structure at all, as Lemke (1988: 159) soon realised:

My own 'covariate structure' (Lemke 1985), which includes Halliday's univariate type, is for the case of homogeneous relations of co-classed units, and should perhaps be called a 'structuring principle' rather than a kind of structure.

Martin's covariate structures are not structures in the sense of units with internal structure, nor in the sense of units forming complexes.

 

[36] The Non-Structural Relations Of Cohesion

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, because cohesive relations are non-structural, they do not qualify as a type of structure.

[2] To be clear, for Halliday & Hasan (1976), a text is not a semantic unit with respect to the lexicogrammatical systems of cohesion. However, in terms of semantic systems, a text is a structured semantic unit. Halliday (1985: 318):

A text has structure, but it is semantic, not lexicogrammatical.

[3] To be clear, in SFL Theory, cohesive relations obtain in the unfolding of text, as patterns of instantiation; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 594ff).

[4] To be clear, in præsentia means 'for the present'.

[5] To be clear, cohesive relations are neither syntagmatic relations (see [3]), nor types of structure.

[35] Cohesive Relations / Covariate Structures

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, because cohesive relations are non-structural, it is theoretically inconsistent to include them in a model of structure types. 

[2] To be clear, Martin's (1992) systems of IDENTIFICATION and IDEATION are rebrandings of Halliday & Hasan's (1976) systems of REFERENCE and LEXICAL COHESION relocated from lexicogrammar to discourse semantics. Evidence here.

[3] Importantly, before 1992, Lemke had already recanted his view that 'covariate' was a type of structure. Lemke (1988: 159):

My own 'covariate structure' (Lemke 1985), which includes Halliday's univariate type, is for the case of homogeneous relations of co-classed units, and should perhaps be called a 'structuring principle' rather than a kind of structure.

[10] The Structure Types To Be Discussed

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, by 'particulate structures', Doran means those of the experiential metafunction. This usage is inconsistent with Martin (1996), where 'particulate' describes the structures of both the experiential (orbital) and logical (serial) metafunctions:

Less importantly, this usage is also inconsistent with Halliday ± Matthiessen (1994, 2004, 2014) who use the term 'segmental' for the structure type favoured by the experiential metafunction. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 85):

[2] To be clear, by 'non-structural relations', Doran means the cohesive relations of the textual metafunction, at the stratum of lexicogrammar, first theorised by Halliday & Hasan (1976). And by 'covariate structures', Doran means Martin's (1992) reinterpretation of Halliday & Hasan's non-structural cohesive relations as covariate structures — after Lemke 1985 — when he rebranded their lexicogrammatical cohesion as his discourse semantics. Importantly, however, by 1992, Lemke had already recanted his view that 'covariate' was a type of structure. Lemke (1988: 159):

My own 'covariate structure' (Lemke 1985), which includes Halliday's univariate type, is for the case of homogeneous relations of co-classed units, and should perhaps be called a 'structuring principle' rather than a kind of structure.

[3] As will be seen as this blog unfolds, the theorising in this paper actually moves from shaky ground to groundlessness.

[9] Doran's Factorial Approach To Structure

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this approach to structure is inconsistent with the fundamental approach to language taken by SFL Theory. As Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 49) point out, SFL Theory takes the view 'from above', asking how meaning is realised, in this case, how the metafunctions are realised structurally.

[2] As this blog unfolds, it will be demonstrated that these factors — nuclearity, linearity and iteration — follow from the model of orbital and serial structure types in Martin (1996), which misidentifies experiential structures with hypotaxis and logical structures with parataxis. See One Of The Problems With Martin's Model Of Structure Types.

[3] To be clear, "the distinct structure types already in use" and "variation within these types" are already accounted for by Halliday ± Matthiessen (1985, 1994, 2004, 2014), and there is no "fuzziness between them", as previously demonstrated on this blog. See Misrepresenting Structure Types As Indeterminate.

[4] As will be seen, these "elements typically left out or not considered structurally" include structure markers misconstrued as units in unit complexes, and non-structural cohesive relations misconstrued as covariate structures (after Martin 1992).