[33] The Basis Of Doran's Nuclearity vs Linearity Distinction

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, although it is not acknowledged here, Doran's distinction between nuclearity (nuclear dependency) and linearity (linear dependency) actually draws on Martin's notion of orbital structure:

Doran's nuclear dependency corresponds to the relation between nucleus and satellite (e.g. Thing and Epithet) in Martin's model, whereas his linear dependency corresponds to the relation between satellite and satellite (e.g. Classifier and Classifier).

As previously explained, Martin's orbital model misconstrues experiential structure as a hypotactic logical structure, with nucleus as dominant and satellite as dependent. So Doran's model continues this misapplication of hypotaxis to a multivariate structure. However, Doran compounds the error by proposing two different types of structure within the same structure:

• nuclear dependency: Thing–Epithet
• linear dependency: Classifier–Classifier

[2] To be clear, in eventually suggesting that nuclearity is the basis for status distinctions, Doran will be merely recognising that Martin's orbital model misconstrues experiential structure as logical hypotaxis.

[31] Some Problems With Doran's Notion Of Nuclear Dependency

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, before Doran, Halliday (1985: 167) identified the Thing as 'the semantic core of the nominal group'.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, in the experiential structure of the nominal group, all the other elements have 'the function of characterising the Thing' (Halliday 1985: 167). The Thing specifies the class of thing, and the other elements specify some category of membership within this class (Halliday 1985: 160).

[3] To be clear, the first nominal group is the artificial invention of a non-native speaker of English, and the second is a reworking of it by Doran. To the extent that the Epithets can be swapped in this unnatural nominal group, it is because they vary little in terms of 'permanence'. Halliday (1985: 166):

By and large, the more permanent the attribute of a Thing, the less likely it is to identify it in a particular context. So we proceed with the very impermanent, quantitative characterisation that is nearest to a Deictic, e.g. three in three balls; through various qualitative features such as new in new ball; and end up with the most permanent, the assignment to a class, e.g. tennis ball. Within the qualitative characteristics, if more than one is specified there is, again, a tendency to more from the less permanent to the more permanent; e.g. a new red ball rather than a red new ball.

On the other hand, the reason why the prepositional phrases serving as Qualifier can be reversed is because they form a paratactic complex, as shown by the fact that either can be omitted.

[4] To be clear, a structure is a structure of a whole unit. Incongruously, Doran here proposes different structures obtaining between different elements within the structure of the same unit. That is, he proposes one structure for the relation between Epithet and Thing, and between Qualifier and Thing, but another structure with regard to the Classifier. (see the next post).

[5] To be clear, Doran's notion of nuclear dependency misconstrues the elements that characterise the Thing, Epithet and Qualifier, as elements that are dependent on the Thing — simply because they relate to the Thing. This misunderstanding derives from confusing interdependency (hypotaxis) with the 'dependency construct' in Halliday (1979):

That is, Doran's notion of nuclear dependency for (portions of) the nominal group is equivalent to a tree structure with Epithets and Qualifiers as nodes branching from the Thing as root node.

[29] Misconstruing Orbital Structure As Not Multivariate

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here Doran misconstrues Martin's two different ways of representing one type of structure — the multivariate structure of the experiential metafunction — as two different types of structure, treating the tree schema representation as multivariate, and the co-tangential ellipses representation as orbital (but not multivariate).

The reason why both are representations of multivariate structure is because both represent the same elements of structure and both represent 'a configuration of elements each having a distinct function with respect to the whole' (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 390).

[2] To be clear, there are problems with both representations in Martin's Figure 7. Firstly, contrā Doran, the co-tangential ellipses representation does not represent an orbital structure, because it does not represent the non-nuclear elements as satellites of a nucleus.

Secondly, the tree schema representation misunderstands grammatical constituency. In SFL theory, grammatical constituency is modelled as a rank scale of forms, such that clauses consist of groups ± phrases, which consist of words, which consist of morphemes.

So, in Figure 7, the whole is the clause, the parts of the clause are the groups that constitute the clause. The structure, on the other hand, is the relationships between experiential functions assigned to the syntagm of groups.

The relation between a whole and its parts is composition (extension), whereas the relation between function and form is realisation (elaboration + identity).

[28] Martin's Orbital Model As Univariate Representation Of A Multivariate Structure

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, Martin's orbital interpretation is a univariate representation of a multivariate structure. The structure is multivariate because it is 'a configuration of elements each having a distinct function with respect to the whole' (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 390): Process, Medium, Agent, Location. The representation is univariate because it misconstrues the structure as a hypotactic relation (dominant nucleus vs dependent satellites).

[26] Problems With Martin's Orbital Model Of Experiential Structure

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Martin (1996) misunderstands Halliday (1985, 1994) and Matthiessen (1995) by misconstruing the (multivariate) experiential structure of a clause as a (univariate) logical structure in which the Process and Medium constitute the dominant element (nucleus), with the Agent and Location as dependent (satellites):

In SFL Theory, interdependency relations obtain between units in unit complexes, not between elements in a unit.

[2] To be clear, the model in Martin (1996) is not only inconsistent with the model in Martin (1992: 319), which preceded Matthiessen (1995):

but also with the model in Martin & Rose (2007: 95), which followed both Matthiessen (1995) and Martin (1996):

[23] Misrepresenting SFL Theory On Hypotaxis

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] Doran's first point is misleading, because it is untrue. In SFL Theory, hypotaxis ("status differences") is a relation in iterative structures of the logical metafunction only. The source of Doran's confusion, as will be seen, is the model of structure in Martin (1996):

which unwittingly misconstrues the distinction between experiential and logical structure as the distinction between hypotaxis (the unequal status of nucleus and satellite) and parataxis (the equal status of multiple nuclei).

[2] As was the case with the multivariate vs univariate distinction, Doran again begins his argument on experiential structure with Halliday's first statement on the matter, instead of later revised theorising.

[3] To be clear, what Doran refers to as a 'flat' structure, Halliday (1979) terms a linear structure.

[21] Misconstruing A Spanish Prepositional Phrase As A Complex

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, from the perspective of SFL Theory, the logical structure of this nominal group is:

That is, what Martin terms 'subjacency complex' is actually the prepositional phrase serving as Postmodifier of the nominal group, and what he terms 'clitic' is actually the preposition of that prepositional phrase.

Importantly, although Martin interprets the prepositional phrase as a logical structure, a complex of Modifier and Head, prepositional phrases do not actually have a logical structure, because they are not groups (or complexes). Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 425):

But note that prepositional phrases are phrases, not groups; they have no logical structure as Head and Modifier, and cannot be reduced to a single element. In this respect, they are clause-like rather than group-like;

Moreover, in terms of constituency, Martin's analysis of the Spanish nominal group is inconsistent with his previous analysis of the English nominal group, since in the Spanish example, the preposition forms a complex with the nominal within the prepositional phrase, whereas, in the English example, the preposition forms a complex with the nominals outside the prepositional phrase.

[2] To be clear, the interpretation of de ruedas as Classifier, rather than Qualifier, is called into question by instances such as los neutrinos solares ('solar neutrinos'):

[20] The Original Sources Of 'Subjacency' And 'Duplex'

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Martin actually called these misconstrued structures 'subjacency duplexes':

[2] To be clear, Martin took the term 'subjacency' from Government and Binding Theory (Chomsky 1973), while Rose (2001) took the term 'duplex' from Matthiessen (1995), where it simply means a two-unit complex. However, Rose (2001) applied the term to verbal group complexes — and nothing else. On this basis, it can be said that Doran's wording above is misleading.

[3] To be clear, given the previous arguments, any use of 'subjacent structures' to describe any of the world's languages is the application of a theoretical confusion.

[19] Martin's Solution To The Non-Problem Of Structure Marker 'Of'

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously observed, the logical structure of this nominal group is:

[2] To be clear, Martin's (quite bizarre) solution to this non-existent problem is to misconstrue the numeral and noun as forming a complex with the preposition of the embedded prepositional phrase:

As previously explained, two litres and of do not form a unit complex because

• of is just one of two constituents of the prepositional phrase of water, and
• there is no logico-semantic relation of expansion or projection between two litres and of.

[3] To be clear, Martin's proposed "complex" is not a complex, and so it is not an iterative structure. On the other hand, if it were a complex, it would be an iterative structure, because all complexes are iterative structures, regardless of the number of units involved.

[18] Misrepresenting The SFL Analysis Of The Structure Marker 'Of'

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the structure marker of is accounted for in terms of the univariate logical structure of the nominal group where it is construed as a constituent of the rankshifted prepositional phrase serving as Postmodifier

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the structure marker of is not dependent on two litres (which is only an embedded nominal group in the multivariate experiential analysis). There are two main reasons for this:

• interdependency relations obtain between units in unit complexes, and two litres and of are not two units that form a unit complex — i.e. two litres and of do not form a nominal group complex, or a preposition group complex — since of is a constituent of the prepositional phrase of water;
• interdependency relations involve the logico-semantic relations of expansion and projection, and there is no such relation between two litres and of.

[3] To be clear, the reason why "we can't have a nominal group of water" is that of water is a prepositional phrase, not a nominal group.

[4] To be clear, the question of whether of can or cannot "re-iterate" only arises from the misunderstandings identified in [1], [2] and [3] above.

[5] To be clear, in this instance, the structure marker of relates the nominals two litres and water and it is modelled in SFL Theory as a constituent of the prepositional phrase that serves as Postmodifier in the univariate structure of the nominal group.

It will be seen in the following post that Martin's proposed solution to this non-existent problem does not in fact relate two litres to the rest of the nominal group, since it only relates two litres to of, and does so by misconstruing of as dependent on two litres in a two-unit complex; see [2] above.

[17] Interdependency

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, parataxis and hypotaxis do not describe relations between elements in function structures. Rather, parataxis and hypotaxis are degrees of interdependency between formal units in unit complexes: between clauses in clause complexes, between groups/phrases in group/phrase complexes, and between words in word complexes; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 451). 

[2] To be clear, it is true that, in SFL Theory, interdependency relations obtain in univariate structures, and not in multivariate structures. This means that they obtain in the iterative structures that realise the logical metafunction.

On the other hand, Doran's notion of "potential for iteration" derives from his previous misconstrual of "iterated" elements as an iterative structure. It will soon be seen that this misunderstanding forms the basis of his next argument.

[16] Proposing A Formal Solution To A Non-Existent Problem

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, there is no problem here, and so, no solution is called for. As previously demonstrated, all Doran's previous examples are unambiguously multivariate structures: segmental structures of the experiential metafunction. Doran's false conclusion derives from confusing "iterated" experiential elements with iterative structures — unit complexes — of the logical metafunction.

[2] As will be seen as this blog unfolds, the 'factors' solution that Doran proposes for this non-existent problem involves adopting the 'distinctive features' approach of Formal phonology to structure types — without regard to the metafunctional meaning that the structures realise.

[15] Misconstruing "Iterated Elements" As Iterative Structure

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Doran's claim here is that a multivariate structure with multiple occurrences of a specific element is inconsistent with the notion of a multivariate structure, because Halliday (1965) stipulated that the elements of a multivariate structure occur only once. 

However, Halliday (1965) was his very first paper distinguishing multivariate and univariate structures, written at the time of Scale & Category Grammar, before the emergence of Systemic Functional Grammar. It also included the similarly mistaken claim that Modifier°Head structures are multivariate, rather than univariate. No paper in the 56 years since Halliday (1965) has claimed that the elements of a multivariate structure occur only once (with the sole exception of the current work of Doran and Martin).

However, what is truly astonishing here is Doran's assumption that Halliday — unlike Doran — would fail to notice that such structures contradict the notion of multivariate structure ascribed to him by Doran.

[2] To be clear, the data that Doran presents as evidence of his claim are artificial constructions, rather than attested examples in natural texts. But, in any case, none of the "iterations" constitutes an iterative structure, since iterative structures are unit complexes, formed out of logico-semantic relations, such as group complexes or clause complexes. That is, the three Epithets do form an "Epithet complex", the two Qualifiers do not form a "Qualifier complex" and the three Locations do not form a "Location complex".

[3] To be clear, the clause example does not support Doran's case, even in Doran's own terms, because it actually features one Location — not three — realised by a (textually motivated) discontinuous elaborating paratactic prepositional phrase complex:

 

Compare the textually agnate clause:

and the agnate clause that deploys embedding instead:

[14] Misrepresenting Korean Nominal Groups

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, it is not true that Korean nominal groups afford a maximum of only one Epithet. This claim is invalidated, for example, by the instance khu-n say chayk ‘big new book’, which appears in the paper Word Order and NP Structure in Korean: A Constraint Based Approach by Kim, Lee & Lee.

[2] To be clear, this example does not demonstrate that potential second Epithets can only be accommodated in Korean nominal groups "through complexing at the rank below".  There are two reasons for this. The first is that jeongi 'electricity' is a Classifier, not a potential Epithet, and the second is that the structure of the nominal group does not involve "complexing at the rank below"; it is simply structured as Epithet ^ Classifier ^ Thing:

[9] Doran's Factorial Approach To Structure

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this approach to structure is inconsistent with the fundamental approach to language taken by SFL Theory. As Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 49) point out, SFL Theory takes the view 'from above', asking how meaning is realised, in this case, how the metafunctions are realised structurally.

[2] As this blog unfolds, it will be demonstrated that these factors — nuclearity, linearity and iteration — follow from the model of orbital and serial structure types in Martin (1996), which misidentifies experiential structures with hypotaxis and logical structures with parataxis. See One Of The Problems With Martin's Model Of Structure Types.

[3] To be clear, "the distinct structure types already in use" and "variation within these types" are already accounted for by Halliday ± Matthiessen (1985, 1994, 2004, 2014), and there is no "fuzziness between them", as previously demonstrated on this blog. See Misrepresenting Structure Types As Indeterminate.

[4] As will be seen, these "elements typically left out or not considered structurally" include structure markers misconstrued as units in unit complexes, and non-structural cohesive relations misconstrued as covariate structures (after Martin 1992).

[7] Misrepresenting "The Conflation Of Distinct Tiers Of Structure" As SFL Theory

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] These bare assertions are very misleading indeed, because on the one hand, there is no indeterminacy ("fuzziness") here — see the previous post — and on the other hand, there is no structure conflation in SFL Theory. As a consequence:

• this non-existent indeterminacy is not "often described in terms of conflation of distinct tiers of structure",
• conflation does not "work well in emphasising that there are tensions occurring between different strands of meaning",
• conflation does not "give us a tool for understanding how this non-existent fuzziness works, or the parameters of variation of this non-existent fuzziness",
• conflation does not "give us an explanation of why a structure occurs", and
• conflation is not relevant to "a description of what the structure is".

[2] And, to be clear, the reason why structure markers are "simply left out of any structural description" is simply that they are not units in unit complexes.

[5] Misrepresenting SFL Theory On The Structure Marker 'Of'

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the structure marker of does not constitute evidence that the structure types in SFL Theory "don't quite account for everything we come up against". To explain:

Firstly, it is misleading to claim that the structure marker of is not accounted for in the SFL model of structure, because it is untrue. The structure marker of is analysed as a constituent of the embedded prepositional phrase serving as Postmodifier in the logical structure of a nominal group:

Secondly, as Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 394) point out, the preposition of is the generalised marker of a structural relationship between nominals. When it functions in this way, therefore, of is not functioning as a unit in a unit complex, and so to model it as such, as Martin does — see here — is to make a category error.

Moreover, contrary to Doran's claim, the 'structure marker' of is also pervasive in English, and the claim that its function is somehow "marginalised" — by not misinterpreting it as a unit in a unit complex — is not only a bare assertion, but also, as demonstrated above, untrue.