[43] Problems With 'Univariate', 'Covariate (Non-Structural)' And 'Subjacent'

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the additional claims here are that

1. parataxis, hypotaxis and phoric covariate are univariate structures,
2. expectancy covariate, hypotaxis and phoric covariate are covariate and non-structural, and
3. subjacency duplexes are subjacent.

With regard to the first claim, parataxis and hypotaxis are indeed degrees of interdependency in univariate structures, but what Doran has relabelled here as hypotaxis was presented as a relation between Classifiers within a nominal group, which is neither univariate nor a (complete) structure. A further problem here is that phoric covariate, which has not been argued for, is not a type of structure, and as such, is not a univariate structure.

With regard to the second claim, there is the basic self-contradiction of glossing (what have been presented as) covariate structures as non-structural. Moreover, neither hypotaxis nor what Doran calls 'hypotaxis' (a relation between Classifiers) is either covariate or non-structural.

The third claim is merely tautological, since it is 'needlessly repetitive without adding information or clarity'.

[41] The Variations In Structure Afforded By Doran's 3 Factors

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this table presents the four cells of the preceding table as 'iterative'.

In the case of the top cell of the 'iterative' column, [non-linear, non-nuclear], this is consistent with SFL Theory, since parataxis is one type of interdependency relation in iterative structures of the logical metafunction.

In the case of the second cell of the 'iterative' column, [non-linear, nuclear], this is not consistent with SFL Theory, because, as previously explained, Doran's 'iteration' confuses multiple occurrences of (experiential) elements — Epithets, Qualifiers, circumstances — with iterative structures of the logical metafunction.

In the case of the third cell of the 'iterative' column, [linear, non-nuclear], this is not consistent with SFL Theory, not least because 'covariate' is not a type of structure, as Lemke (1989) acknowledges.

In the case of the bottom cell of the 'iterative' column, [linear, nuclear], this would be consistent with SFL Theory, if hypotaxis had been what Doran argued for, since hypotaxis is one type of interdependency relation in iterative structures of the logical metafunction. However, Doran's argument for this classification was actually concerned with the relation between Classifiers in the experiential structure of the nominal group.

This bottom cell also features a category for which there has been no argumentation, 'phoric covariate'. Again, the problem here is that 'covariate' is not a type of structure, and so not iterative in a structural sense.

[2] The 'non-iterative' column of the table has only two of its four cells filled.

The upper cell, [non-linear, nuclear], is consistent with SFL Theory in as much as experiential structures are multivariate and so non-iterative.

However, the lower cell, [linear, nuclear], identifies the subjacency duplex. On the one hand, there has been no argument for classifying this structure as linear, and on the other hand, the subjacency duplex is not a structure, not least because it is based on misunderstandings of constituency. See, for example, the previous posts:

• Misrepresenting The SFL Analysis Of The Structure Marker 'Of'
• Martin's Solution To The Non-Problem Of Structure Marker 'Of'
• Misconstruing A Spanish Prepositional Phrase As A Complex

[40] Problems With Linearity x Nuclearity

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the top left cell of the table, [non-nuclear, non-linear], 'parataxis', has not been argued for in this paper. It corresponds to Martin's serial (multi-nuclear) structure, which, as previously demonstrated, is a misconstrual of all logical structure as parataxis.

[2] To be clear, the top right cell of the table, [non-nuclear, linear], 'expectancy covariate', is not a structure type, as later acknowledged by the theorist who first formulated it: Lemke (1989). 

[3] To be clear, the bottom left cell of the table, [nuclear, non-linear], 'orbital', only applies to part of a structure, not to the entire structure of a unit. It corresponds to the nucleus-satellite relation in Martin's experiential orbital structure.

[4] To be clear, the bottom right cell of the table, [nuclear, linear], 'hypotaxis', also only applies to part of a structure, not to the entire structure of a unit. It corresponds to the satellite-satellite relation in Martin's experiential orbital structure.

However, there are further inconsistencies in this case. Firstly, in the preceding argument, the example of this category, solar electron neutrons, was categorised as linear, but not nuclear, whereas here it is categorised as both linear and nuclear.

Secondly, the preceding argument for this category was based on experiential structure — relations between Classifiers — whereas here it is reconstrued as a hypotactic logical structure.

Thirdly, the preceding argument for this category was concerned with only part of a structure — relations between Classifiers in a nominal group — whereas here it reconstrued as applying to the structure of the entire unit (nominal group).

[5] In short, Doran has here categorised three of Martin's misunderstandings of structure types — covariate, orbital, serial — in terms of distinctive features. In doing so, he essentially provides a flawed system to specify classes — not functions — in metalanguage — not language — without regard to the metafunctions that the structure types express.

[39] Problems With The Factors Of Covariate Structures

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, as previously demonstrated, Doran's linearity corresponds to the relation between satellites in Martin's orbital (mono-nuclear) model of structure, which, in turn, misrepresents the multivariate structure of the experiential metafunction as a univariate hypotactic structure of the logical metafunction.

[2] To be clear, in Doran's own terms, it could be argued that there is indeed "difference in status" in this example: between the whole (dog) on the one hand, and the parts (mouth, teeth, neck), on the other. 

(Note that conformation is not a part of body or dog, since it refers to the form or shape of the dog.)

[38] Problems With Lexical Relations As Structures

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, 'lexical relations' refers to Martin's (1992) system of IDEATION, which is his rebranding of his misunderstandings of lexical cohesion (Halliday & Hasan 1976), relocated from textual lexicogrammar to experiential discourse semantics. Evidence here.

Importantly, from the perspective of SFL Theory, these cohesive relations are not structures, either in the sense of a unit as a configuration of elements, or in the sense of a complex of units.

[2] To be clear, Doran's second point again confuses the general notion of iteration (repetition) with iterative as a specific type of structure that realises the logical metafunction.

[3] To be clear, Doran's third point mistakes meronymic relations for interdependency relations, and mistakes lexical items for elements of structure.

[4] To be clear, Doran's fourth and fifth points are untenable, even in his own model. On the one hand, if these were relations of dependency, the relation would be hypotaxis, which corresponds, in terms of Doran's resources, to Martin's orbital (mono-nuclear) structure. So, on this basis, there should be a nucleus to which everything else relates.

On the other hand, given that these are part-whole relations, Doran could just as easily make the argument, from his own perspective, that the whole constitutes the nucleus, with the parts as satellites, though this would undermine the point he is trying to make.

And, in the final line, Doran shows again that he does not understand that 'interdependency' refers to taxis (parataxis and hypotaxis). 

[37] The Problem With Covariate Structures

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, on the basis of Martin's term 'discourse semantics', Doran here presents the distinction between discourse and grammar as stratal. However, in SFL Theory, 'discourse' refers to one angle on language as instance. Halliday (2008: 78):

“discourse” is text that is being viewed in its sociocultural context, while “text” is discourse that is being viewed as a process of language.

And analysing discourse means relating the text to the grammar as potential. Halliday (2008: 192):

The system and the text are not two different phenomena: what we call the “system” of a language is equivalent to its “text potential”. Analysing discourse means, first and foremost, relating the text to the potential that lies behind it.

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 731):

A text is meaningful because it is an actualisation of the potential that constitutes the linguistic system; it is for this reason that the study of discourse (‘text linguistics’) cannot properly be separated from the study of the grammar that lies behind it.

And it is the textual component within the grammar that is the resource for creating discourse. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 528):

The “textual” metafunction is the name we give to the systematic resources a language must have for creating discourse: for ensuring that each instance of text makes contact with its environment. The “environment” includes both the context of situation and other instances of text.

And the systems of cohesion constitute the non-structural textual resources of the grammar for creating discourse.

[2] To be clear, covariate structures are not types of structure at all, as Lemke (1988: 159) soon realised:

My own 'covariate structure' (Lemke 1985), which includes Halliday's univariate type, is for the case of homogeneous relations of co-classed units, and should perhaps be called a 'structuring principle' rather than a kind of structure.

Martin's covariate structures are not structures in the sense of units with internal structure, nor in the sense of units forming complexes.

 

[35] Cohesive Relations / Covariate Structures

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, because cohesive relations are non-structural, it is theoretically inconsistent to include them in a model of structure types. 

[2] To be clear, Martin's (1992) systems of IDENTIFICATION and IDEATION are rebrandings of Halliday & Hasan's (1976) systems of REFERENCE and LEXICAL COHESION relocated from lexicogrammar to discourse semantics. Evidence here.

[3] Importantly, before 1992, Lemke had already recanted his view that 'covariate' was a type of structure. Lemke (1988: 159):

My own 'covariate structure' (Lemke 1985), which includes Halliday's univariate type, is for the case of homogeneous relations of co-classed units, and should perhaps be called a 'structuring principle' rather than a kind of structure.

[10] The Structure Types To Be Discussed

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, by 'particulate structures', Doran means those of the experiential metafunction. This usage is inconsistent with Martin (1996), where 'particulate' describes the structures of both the experiential (orbital) and logical (serial) metafunctions:

Less importantly, this usage is also inconsistent with Halliday ± Matthiessen (1994, 2004, 2014) who use the term 'segmental' for the structure type favoured by the experiential metafunction. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 85):

[2] To be clear, by 'non-structural relations', Doran means the cohesive relations of the textual metafunction, at the stratum of lexicogrammar, first theorised by Halliday & Hasan (1976). And by 'covariate structures', Doran means Martin's (1992) reinterpretation of Halliday & Hasan's non-structural cohesive relations as covariate structures — after Lemke 1985 — when he rebranded their lexicogrammatical cohesion as his discourse semantics. Importantly, however, by 1992, Lemke had already recanted his view that 'covariate' was a type of structure. Lemke (1988: 159):

My own 'covariate structure' (Lemke 1985), which includes Halliday's univariate type, is for the case of homogeneous relations of co-classed units, and should perhaps be called a 'structuring principle' rather than a kind of structure.

[3] As will be seen as this blog unfolds, the theorising in this paper actually moves from shaky ground to groundlessness.

[9] Doran's Factorial Approach To Structure

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this approach to structure is inconsistent with the fundamental approach to language taken by SFL Theory. As Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 49) point out, SFL Theory takes the view 'from above', asking how meaning is realised, in this case, how the metafunctions are realised structurally.

[2] As this blog unfolds, it will be demonstrated that these factors — nuclearity, linearity and iteration — follow from the model of orbital and serial structure types in Martin (1996), which misidentifies experiential structures with hypotaxis and logical structures with parataxis. See One Of The Problems With Martin's Model Of Structure Types.

[3] To be clear, "the distinct structure types already in use" and "variation within these types" are already accounted for by Halliday ± Matthiessen (1985, 1994, 2004, 2014), and there is no "fuzziness between them", as previously demonstrated on this blog. See Misrepresenting Structure Types As Indeterminate.

[4] As will be seen, these "elements typically left out or not considered structurally" include structure markers misconstrued as units in unit complexes, and non-structural cohesive relations misconstrued as covariate structures (after Martin 1992).