[41] The Variations In Structure Afforded By Doran's 3 Factors

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this table presents the four cells of the preceding table as 'iterative'.

In the case of the top cell of the 'iterative' column, [non-linear, non-nuclear], this is consistent with SFL Theory, since parataxis is one type of interdependency relation in iterative structures of the logical metafunction.

In the case of the second cell of the 'iterative' column, [non-linear, nuclear], this is not consistent with SFL Theory, because, as previously explained, Doran's 'iteration' confuses multiple occurrences of (experiential) elements — Epithets, Qualifiers, circumstances — with iterative structures of the logical metafunction.

In the case of the third cell of the 'iterative' column, [linear, non-nuclear], this is not consistent with SFL Theory, not least because 'covariate' is not a type of structure, as Lemke (1989) acknowledges.

In the case of the bottom cell of the 'iterative' column, [linear, nuclear], this would be consistent with SFL Theory, if hypotaxis had been what Doran argued for, since hypotaxis is one type of interdependency relation in iterative structures of the logical metafunction. However, Doran's argument for this classification was actually concerned with the relation between Classifiers in the experiential structure of the nominal group.

This bottom cell also features a category for which there has been no argumentation, 'phoric covariate'. Again, the problem here is that 'covariate' is not a type of structure, and so not iterative in a structural sense.

[2] The 'non-iterative' column of the table has only two of its four cells filled.

The upper cell, [non-linear, nuclear], is consistent with SFL Theory in as much as experiential structures are multivariate and so non-iterative.

However, the lower cell, [linear, nuclear], identifies the subjacency duplex. On the one hand, there has been no argument for classifying this structure as linear, and on the other hand, the subjacency duplex is not a structure, not least because it is based on misunderstandings of constituency. See, for example, the previous posts:

• Misrepresenting The SFL Analysis Of The Structure Marker 'Of'
• Martin's Solution To The Non-Problem Of Structure Marker 'Of'
• Misconstruing A Spanish Prepositional Phrase As A Complex

[40] Problems With Linearity x Nuclearity

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the top left cell of the table, [non-nuclear, non-linear], 'parataxis', has not been argued for in this paper. It corresponds to Martin's serial (multi-nuclear) structure, which, as previously demonstrated, is a misconstrual of all logical structure as parataxis.

[2] To be clear, the top right cell of the table, [non-nuclear, linear], 'expectancy covariate', is not a structure type, as later acknowledged by the theorist who first formulated it: Lemke (1989). 

[3] To be clear, the bottom left cell of the table, [nuclear, non-linear], 'orbital', only applies to part of a structure, not to the entire structure of a unit. It corresponds to the nucleus-satellite relation in Martin's experiential orbital structure.

[4] To be clear, the bottom right cell of the table, [nuclear, linear], 'hypotaxis', also only applies to part of a structure, not to the entire structure of a unit. It corresponds to the satellite-satellite relation in Martin's experiential orbital structure.

However, there are further inconsistencies in this case. Firstly, in the preceding argument, the example of this category, solar electron neutrons, was categorised as linear, but not nuclear, whereas here it is categorised as both linear and nuclear.

Secondly, the preceding argument for this category was based on experiential structure — relations between Classifiers — whereas here it is reconstrued as a hypotactic logical structure.

Thirdly, the preceding argument for this category was concerned with only part of a structure — relations between Classifiers in a nominal group — whereas here it reconstrued as applying to the structure of the entire unit (nominal group).

[5] In short, Doran has here categorised three of Martin's misunderstandings of structure types — covariate, orbital, serial — in terms of distinctive features. In doing so, he essentially provides a flawed system to specify classes — not functions — in metalanguage — not language — without regard to the metafunctions that the structure types express.

[39] Problems With The Factors Of Covariate Structures

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, as previously demonstrated, Doran's linearity corresponds to the relation between satellites in Martin's orbital (mono-nuclear) model of structure, which, in turn, misrepresents the multivariate structure of the experiential metafunction as a univariate hypotactic structure of the logical metafunction.

[2] To be clear, in Doran's own terms, it could be argued that there is indeed "difference in status" in this example: between the whole (dog) on the one hand, and the parts (mouth, teeth, neck), on the other. 

(Note that conformation is not a part of body or dog, since it refers to the form or shape of the dog.)

[38] Problems With Lexical Relations As Structures

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, 'lexical relations' refers to Martin's (1992) system of IDEATION, which is his rebranding of his misunderstandings of lexical cohesion (Halliday & Hasan 1976), relocated from textual lexicogrammar to experiential discourse semantics. Evidence here.

Importantly, from the perspective of SFL Theory, these cohesive relations are not structures, either in the sense of a unit as a configuration of elements, or in the sense of a complex of units.

[2] To be clear, Doran's second point again confuses the general notion of iteration (repetition) with iterative as a specific type of structure that realises the logical metafunction.

[3] To be clear, Doran's third point mistakes meronymic relations for interdependency relations, and mistakes lexical items for elements of structure.

[4] To be clear, Doran's fourth and fifth points are untenable, even in his own model. On the one hand, if these were relations of dependency, the relation would be hypotaxis, which corresponds, in terms of Doran's resources, to Martin's orbital (mono-nuclear) structure. So, on this basis, there should be a nucleus to which everything else relates.

On the other hand, given that these are part-whole relations, Doran could just as easily make the argument, from his own perspective, that the whole constitutes the nucleus, with the parts as satellites, though this would undermine the point he is trying to make.

And, in the final line, Doran shows again that he does not understand that 'interdependency' refers to taxis (parataxis and hypotaxis). 

[34] Problems With The Three Factors: Iteration, Nuclearity And Linearity

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, as previously demonstrated:

• 'iteration' confuses multiple occurrences of multivariate elements with iterative structure;
• 'nuclearity' corresponds to a hypotactic relation between Martin's nucleus and satellite;
• 'linearity' corresponds to a hypotactic relation between Martin's satellite and satellite

where Martin's model misconstrues a multivariate experiential structure as a univariate logical structure.

[2] To be clear, on this model, the experiential structure of a nominal group like new two-storey brick house involves all three factors:

• iteration: 2 Classifiers;
• nuclearity: Thing–Epithet "status distinction" (logical hypotaxis);
• linearity: Classifier–Classifier "interdependency" (logical hypotaxis).

Clearly, Doran does not understand that "status distinction" (hypotaxis) is a type of interdependency.

[31] Some Problems With Doran's Notion Of Nuclear Dependency

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, before Doran, Halliday (1985: 167) identified the Thing as 'the semantic core of the nominal group'.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, in the experiential structure of the nominal group, all the other elements have 'the function of characterising the Thing' (Halliday 1985: 167). The Thing specifies the class of thing, and the other elements specify some category of membership within this class (Halliday 1985: 160).

[3] To be clear, the first nominal group is the artificial invention of a non-native speaker of English, and the second is a reworking of it by Doran. To the extent that the Epithets can be swapped in this unnatural nominal group, it is because they vary little in terms of 'permanence'. Halliday (1985: 166):

By and large, the more permanent the attribute of a Thing, the less likely it is to identify it in a particular context. So we proceed with the very impermanent, quantitative characterisation that is nearest to a Deictic, e.g. three in three balls; through various qualitative features such as new in new ball; and end up with the most permanent, the assignment to a class, e.g. tennis ball. Within the qualitative characteristics, if more than one is specified there is, again, a tendency to more from the less permanent to the more permanent; e.g. a new red ball rather than a red new ball.

On the other hand, the reason why the prepositional phrases serving as Qualifier can be reversed is because they form a paratactic complex, as shown by the fact that either can be omitted.

[4] To be clear, a structure is a structure of a whole unit. Incongruously, Doran here proposes different structures obtaining between different elements within the structure of the same unit. That is, he proposes one structure for the relation between Epithet and Thing, and between Qualifier and Thing, but another structure with regard to the Classifier. (see the next post).

[5] To be clear, Doran's notion of nuclear dependency misconstrues the elements that characterise the Thing, Epithet and Qualifier, as elements that are dependent on the Thing — simply because they relate to the Thing. This misunderstanding derives from confusing interdependency (hypotaxis) with the 'dependency construct' in Halliday (1979):

That is, Doran's notion of nuclear dependency for (portions of) the nominal group is equivalent to a tree structure with Epithets and Qualifiers as nodes branching from the Thing as root node.

[29] Misconstruing Orbital Structure As Not Multivariate

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here Doran misconstrues Martin's two different ways of representing one type of structure — the multivariate structure of the experiential metafunction — as two different types of structure, treating the tree schema representation as multivariate, and the co-tangential ellipses representation as orbital (but not multivariate).

The reason why both are representations of multivariate structure is because both represent the same elements of structure and both represent 'a configuration of elements each having a distinct function with respect to the whole' (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 390).

[2] To be clear, there are problems with both representations in Martin's Figure 7. Firstly, contrā Doran, the co-tangential ellipses representation does not represent an orbital structure, because it does not represent the non-nuclear elements as satellites of a nucleus.

Secondly, the tree schema representation misunderstands grammatical constituency. In SFL theory, grammatical constituency is modelled as a rank scale of forms, such that clauses consist of groups ± phrases, which consist of words, which consist of morphemes.

So, in Figure 7, the whole is the clause, the parts of the clause are the groups that constitute the clause. The structure, on the other hand, is the relationships between experiential functions assigned to the syntagm of groups.

The relation between a whole and its parts is composition (extension), whereas the relation between function and form is realisation (elaboration + identity).

[26] Problems With Martin's Orbital Model Of Experiential Structure

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Martin (1996) misunderstands Halliday (1985, 1994) and Matthiessen (1995) by misconstruing the (multivariate) experiential structure of a clause as a (univariate) logical structure in which the Process and Medium constitute the dominant element (nucleus), with the Agent and Location as dependent (satellites):

In SFL Theory, interdependency relations obtain between units in unit complexes, not between elements in a unit.

[2] To be clear, the model in Martin (1996) is not only inconsistent with the model in Martin (1992: 319), which preceded Matthiessen (1995):

but also with the model in Martin & Rose (2007: 95), which followed both Matthiessen (1995) and Martin (1996):

[25] Martin's Orbital And Serial Structures

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, before Matthiessen (1995), Martin's (1992: 22) model was:

and after Matthiessen (1995), Martin's (1996) model became:

[2] As previously explained, Martin's orbital structure misconstrues the multivariate structure of the experiential metafunction as the univariate relation of hypotaxis. As Doran confirms, "there is status distinction" (nucleus vs satellite).

[3] To be clear, Martin's serial structure, which, contrā Doran, he does not class as iterative, is not just similar to univariate structure, it is Martin's model of univariate structure. However, as previously explained, in modelling logical structure as multi-nuclear, it construes each unit as having the same status, and so reduces all univariate structure to parataxis.

[24] The Nuclear Model Of Clause Transitivity

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in this early, first exploration of structure types by metafunction, Halliday (1979) considered three non-linear representations of experiential structure (in addition to the linear):

[2] Importantly, 'dependency construct' refers to a tree structure schema, not to interdependency in the sense of tactic relations between units. It will be seen in future posts that Doran confuses the two.

[3] To be clear, the notion of a clause nucleus was taken up in Halliday (1985: 147) — and every edition of IFG since — but applied to the ergative model, not the transitive model, of clause transitivity:

The Process and the Medium together form the nucleus of an English clause; and this nucleus then determines the range of options that are available to the rest of the clause. Thus the nucleus ‘tear + cloth’ represents a small semantic field which may be realised as a clause either alone or in combination with other participant or circumstantial functions.

Matthiessen (1995: 197) then developed this as a cline of nuclearity/peripherality of involvement:

which was then greatly elaborated in Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 165-176) as degree of participation and degree of involvement, and used to relate participants and circumstances in terms of logico-semantic relations:

[23] Misrepresenting SFL Theory On Hypotaxis

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] Doran's first point is misleading, because it is untrue. In SFL Theory, hypotaxis ("status differences") is a relation in iterative structures of the logical metafunction only. The source of Doran's confusion, as will be seen, is the model of structure in Martin (1996):

which unwittingly misconstrues the distinction between experiential and logical structure as the distinction between hypotaxis (the unequal status of nucleus and satellite) and parataxis (the equal status of multiple nuclei).

[2] As was the case with the multivariate vs univariate distinction, Doran again begins his argument on experiential structure with Halliday's first statement on the matter, instead of later revised theorising.

[3] To be clear, what Doran refers to as a 'flat' structure, Halliday (1979) terms a linear structure.

[19] Martin's Solution To The Non-Problem Of Structure Marker 'Of'

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously observed, the logical structure of this nominal group is:

[2] To be clear, Martin's (quite bizarre) solution to this non-existent problem is to misconstrue the numeral and noun as forming a complex with the preposition of the embedded prepositional phrase:

As previously explained, two litres and of do not form a unit complex because

• of is just one of two constituents of the prepositional phrase of water, and
• there is no logico-semantic relation of expansion or projection between two litres and of.

[3] To be clear, Martin's proposed "complex" is not a complex, and so it is not an iterative structure. On the other hand, if it were a complex, it would be an iterative structure, because all complexes are iterative structures, regardless of the number of units involved.

[18] Misrepresenting The SFL Analysis Of The Structure Marker 'Of'

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the structure marker of is accounted for in terms of the univariate logical structure of the nominal group where it is construed as a constituent of the rankshifted prepositional phrase serving as Postmodifier

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the structure marker of is not dependent on two litres (which is only an embedded nominal group in the multivariate experiential analysis). There are two main reasons for this:

• interdependency relations obtain between units in unit complexes, and two litres and of are not two units that form a unit complex — i.e. two litres and of do not form a nominal group complex, or a preposition group complex — since of is a constituent of the prepositional phrase of water;
• interdependency relations involve the logico-semantic relations of expansion and projection, and there is no such relation between two litres and of.

[3] To be clear, the reason why "we can't have a nominal group of water" is that of water is a prepositional phrase, not a nominal group.

[4] To be clear, the question of whether of can or cannot "re-iterate" only arises from the misunderstandings identified in [1], [2] and [3] above.

[5] To be clear, in this instance, the structure marker of relates the nominals two litres and water and it is modelled in SFL Theory as a constituent of the prepositional phrase that serves as Postmodifier in the univariate structure of the nominal group.

It will be seen in the following post that Martin's proposed solution to this non-existent problem does not in fact relate two litres to the rest of the nominal group, since it only relates two litres to of, and does so by misconstruing of as dependent on two litres in a two-unit complex; see [2] above.

[15] Misconstruing "Iterated Elements" As Iterative Structure

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Doran's claim here is that a multivariate structure with multiple occurrences of a specific element is inconsistent with the notion of a multivariate structure, because Halliday (1965) stipulated that the elements of a multivariate structure occur only once. 

However, Halliday (1965) was his very first paper distinguishing multivariate and univariate structures, written at the time of Scale & Category Grammar, before the emergence of Systemic Functional Grammar. It also included the similarly mistaken claim that Modifier°Head structures are multivariate, rather than univariate. No paper in the 56 years since Halliday (1965) has claimed that the elements of a multivariate structure occur only once (with the sole exception of the current work of Doran and Martin).

However, what is truly astonishing here is Doran's assumption that Halliday — unlike Doran — would fail to notice that such structures contradict the notion of multivariate structure ascribed to him by Doran.

[2] To be clear, the data that Doran presents as evidence of his claim are artificial constructions, rather than attested examples in natural texts. But, in any case, none of the "iterations" constitutes an iterative structure, since iterative structures are unit complexes, formed out of logico-semantic relations, such as group complexes or clause complexes. That is, the three Epithets do form an "Epithet complex", the two Qualifiers do not form a "Qualifier complex" and the three Locations do not form a "Location complex".

[3] To be clear, the clause example does not support Doran's case, even in Doran's own terms, because it actually features one Location — not three — realised by a (textually motivated) discontinuous elaborating paratactic prepositional phrase complex:

 

Compare the textually agnate clause:

and the agnate clause that deploys embedding instead:

[10] The Structure Types To Be Discussed

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, by 'particulate structures', Doran means those of the experiential metafunction. This usage is inconsistent with Martin (1996), where 'particulate' describes the structures of both the experiential (orbital) and logical (serial) metafunctions:

Less importantly, this usage is also inconsistent with Halliday ± Matthiessen (1994, 2004, 2014) who use the term 'segmental' for the structure type favoured by the experiential metafunction. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 85):

[2] To be clear, by 'non-structural relations', Doran means the cohesive relations of the textual metafunction, at the stratum of lexicogrammar, first theorised by Halliday & Hasan (1976). And by 'covariate structures', Doran means Martin's (1992) reinterpretation of Halliday & Hasan's non-structural cohesive relations as covariate structures — after Lemke 1985 — when he rebranded their lexicogrammatical cohesion as his discourse semantics. Importantly, however, by 1992, Lemke had already recanted his view that 'covariate' was a type of structure. Lemke (1988: 159):

My own 'covariate structure' (Lemke 1985), which includes Halliday's univariate type, is for the case of homogeneous relations of co-classed units, and should perhaps be called a 'structuring principle' rather than a kind of structure.

[3] As will be seen as this blog unfolds, the theorising in this paper actually moves from shaky ground to groundlessness.

[6] Misrepresenting Structure Types As Indeterminate

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because there is no indeterminacy here. 

The experiential structure of the verbal group is clearly multivariate, because, like all multivariate structures, it is 'a configuration of different functional relationships' (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 451): Finite vs Auxiliary vs Event. The number of Auxiliaries is irrelevant to this definition of a multivariate structure.*

The logical structure of the verbal group is clearly univariate, because, like all univariate structures, it is the iteration of the same functional relationship' (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 451), in this case: modification (α is modified by β, which is modified by γ). The number of modifications is irrelevant to this definition of a univariate structure.

[2] To be clear, the English system of TENSE is realised by the logical structure only, not by the experiential structure (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 398).

* See the upcoming posts of 11 and 15 September.

[4] Misrepresenting SFL On Structural Subtypes

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

This is misleading, because it is not true. 

On the one hand, sixty years ago, SFL Theory did not exist. Halliday (1961) outlined Halliday's first theory, Scale & Category Grammar, and did not include any discussion of types of structure, though Halliday (1965) did introduce the distinction between multivariate and univariate structures, focusing on the latter. The first statement on structure types varying according to metafunction was Modes of meaning and modes of expression: types of grammatical structure and their determination by different semantic functions (Halliday 1979). An earlier paper on structure, Language structure and language function (Halliday 1970) did not propose such a structure typology.

On the other hand, a range of subtypes has not been proposed for any of the structure types. That is, a range of subtypes has not been proposed for culminative (textual), prosodic (interpersonal), segmental (experiential) or iterative (logical) structures. The relations in iterative structures have always been limited to either hypotactic or paratactic, and both relations may obtain within the same structure.

[3] Halliday (1979) On Structure Types

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

The following summary, from the same early paper, will also be useful for later discussions. Halliday (2002 [1979]: 217):

In English, experiential options tend to generate constituent-like structures, actually constellations of elements such as can be fairly easily represented in constituency terms. Interpersonal options generate prosodic structures, extending over long stretches (for example intonation contours), which are much less constituent-like. Textual options generate culminative structures, elements occurring at the boundaries of significant units, and give a kind of periodicity to the text, which is part of what we recognise as “texture”. Logical options generate recursive structures, paratactic and hypotactic, which differ from all the other three in that they generate complexes — clause complex, group complex, word complex – and not simple units.

[2] Types Of Structure In SFL Theory

Doran (2021):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the SFL model, since 1994, is given in Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 85, 452):

[2] What Doran has in mind are Martin's models, which will be demonstrated here to involve theoretical misunderstandings and inconsistencies. These include the following from Martin (1992: 13, 22):

and Martin (1996):